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Abstract 
As the range of potential uses for Artificial Intelligence (AI), in particular machine learning (ML), has 
increased, so has awareness of the associated ethical issues. This increased awareness has led to the 
realisation that existing legislation and regulation provides insufficient protection to individuals, 
groups, society, and the environment from AI harms. In response to this realisation, there has been a 
proliferation of principle-based ethics codes, guidelines and frameworks. However, it has become 
increasingly clear that a significant gap exists between the theory of AI ethics principles and the 
practical design of AI systems. In previous work , we analysed whether it is possible to close this gap 
between the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of AI ethics through the use of tools and methods designed to help 
AI developers, engineers, and designers translate principles into practice. We concluded that this 
method of closure is currently ineffective as almost all existing translational tools and methods are 
either too flexible (and thus vulnerable to ethics washing) or too strict (unresponsive to context). This 
raised the question: if, even with technical guidance, AI ethics is challenging to embed in the process 
of algorithmic design, is the entire pro-ethical design endeavour rendered futile? And, if no, then how 
can AI ethics be made useful for AI practitioners? This is the question we seek to address here by 
exploring why principles and technical translational tools are still needed even if they are limited, and 
how these limitations can be potentially overcome by providing theoretical grounding of a concept 
that has been termed ‘Ethics as a Service’ 
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1. Introduction 
As the range of potential uses for Artificial Intelligence (AI), in particular machine learning (ML), has 
increased, so has awareness of the ethical issues posed by the design, development, deployment and 
use of AI systems (henceforth collapsed into ‘Design’). Issues such as privacy, fairness, accountability, 
accessibility, environmental sustainability, and transparency are now not just discussed in academic 
literature but also in mainstream media. This increased awareness has led to the realisation that existing 
‘hard’ governance mechanisms (such as legislation and other regulatory frameworks, e.g. ISO 
requirements) alone provide insufficient protection to individuals, groups, society, and the 
environment. Similarly, these mechanisms alone do not sufficiently incentivise the Design of socially 
preferable and environmentally sustainable AI. In an attempt to overcome these limitations, 
governments, private sector organisations, and others have focused on the development of ‘soft’ 
governance mechanisms such as ethics codes, guidelines, frameworks, and policy strategies (Floridi, 
2018; Schiff et al., 2020). The development of these largely principle-based documents has been an 
important and necessary phase in the evolution of AI governance (Mulgan, 2019; Raab, 2020).  
However, it has become increasingly clear that highly abstract principles provide little protection from 
potential harms related to AI when AI practitioners have no guidance on how to design and deploy 
algorithms within these ethical boundaries (Clarke, 2019; Orr & Davis, 2020). In other words, a 
significant gap exists between theory and practice within the AI ethics field (Ville et al., 2019). This is 
not unusual in ethics (consider for example the development of bioethics), where changes are 
sometimes theory-led, and can partly be explained by the relative ‘newness’ of the concept of AI ethical 
principles in the public policy domain1: less than 20% of all the AI ethics documents are more than 
four-years old (Jobin et al., 2019). However, it may also be a result of the desire by influential private-
sector organisations to ‘ethics wash’ (Floridi, 2019b) in an attempt to keep the ethics of AI a self-
regulated field and delay legislative intervention (Butcher & Beridze, 2019). 
         In previous work (Morley et al., 2019), we analysed whether it may be possible to start closing 
this gap between the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of AI ethics by identifying the methods and tools already 
available to help AI developers, engineers, and designers (collectively ‘practitioners’ (Orr & Davis, 
2020)) know not only what to do or not to do, but also how to do it, or avoid doing it, by adopting an 
ethical perspective (Alshammari & Simpson, 2017).  We plotted the tools in a typology, matching them 
 
1 Differentiating between public policy and research domains is important here. AI researchers have long been aware of 
the ethical implications of algorithms. Both Alan Turing and Norbert Wiener were writing on the topic as early as 1940. 
It has taken a longer time for policymakers, regulators and legislators to become interested in the topic. 
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to ethical principles (beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, justice and explicability) and to stages 
in the algorithm development pipeline. Although we found that numerous tools and methodologies 
exist to help AI practitioners translate between the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of AI ethics, we also found 
that the vast majority of these tools are severely limited in terms of usability. The development of 
these translational tools and methods may have been useful for enabling individual groups of 
researchers/companies to raise internal awareness of AI ethics and to examine different 
interpretations of ethical principles. However, this impact has not been sufficiently tested and the 
external validity of all the tools/methods identified remains questionable. There is, as of yet, little 
evidence that the use of any of these translational tools/methods has an impact on the governability 
of algorithmic systems. As such, we cannot yet know whether they help disadvantaged groups in 
society be heard and enabled to embed and protect their values in design tools, and then into the 
resultant AI systems. Consequently, we concluded that the existing translational tools and methods 
fail to operationalise AI ethics effectively. Almost all translational tools are either too flexible or too 
strict in the following sense (Arvan, 2018). When something (ethical tools, methods or guidelines) is 
too flexible it does little to protect against the risks of ethics shopping and ethics washing (Floridi, 
2019b). In contrast, if the same something is too strict,  and approaches ethical governance in a top-
down way, it fails to account for the fact that sometimes there is no social consensus about what is 
the ‘right’ way to interpret or apply ethics or ethical principles – this instead depends on how aggregate 
views of society are collected and which voices are included (Allen et al., 2000; Baum, 2017).  This 
overall conclusion (too flexible or strict) forces the AI ethics community to face the difficult question: 
if, even with technical guidance (such as that provided in IEEE’s Ethically Aligned Design standards 
(IEEE Standards Association, 2019)) AI ethics is challenging to embed in the process of algorithmic 
Design, is the entire pro-ethical design (Floridi, 2019a) endeavour rendered futile? And, if no, then 
how can AI ethics be made useful for AI practitioners? 
         In the following pages, we seek to answer these questions by exploring why principles and 
technical translational tools are still needed even if they are limited, and how these limitations can be 
potentially overcome by providing theoretical grounding of a concept that has been termed ‘Ethics as 
a Service’2. Specifically, the sections ‘lowering the level of abstraction’ and  ‘limits of principlism and 
 
2 As will become clear through the development of the ‘Ethics as a Service’ concept in the following pages – our use of 
the concept is one grounded in the theory of Habermas’s discourse ethics (Heath, 2014; Mingers & Walsham, 2010; 
Rehg, 2015) and Floridi’s distributed responsibility (Floridi, 2016). This makes our interpretation of the concept distinct 
from the technocratic interpretation espoused by Google and other large tech firms claiming that they can ‘audit 
customers’ AI systems for ethical integrity’ (Simonite, 2020). This paper should not, therefore, be read as being in 
support of such claims. 
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translational tools’ explain in more detail the limitations of principlism and existing translational tools 
and methods. The section titled ‘a series of compromises’ outlines the compromises that must be 
made to enable the practical operationalisation of AI ethics. The section ‘Outlining Ethics as a Service’ 
provides the theory underpinning the concept of ‘Ethics as a Service’. The final section concludes the 
article, highlighting where further research is needed.  
  
2. Lowering the level of abstraction  
AI ethical guidance documents have been produced by a range of stakeholders, from technology 
companies, professional bodies and standards-setting bodies to governments and research 
organisations (Whittlestone et al., 2019). According to the Global Inventory of AI Ethics Guidelines, 
managed by Algorithm Watch, there are now more than 160 documents in existence (Alglorithm 
Watch, 2020).  Whilst it is possible to summarise the principles contained within these documents as 
beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, justice and explicability (Floridi & Cowls, 2019), the range 
of concepts covered is vast and includes transparency; fairness; responsibility; privacy; freedom; trust; 
sustainability; dignity and solidarity (Jobin et al., 2019). 
This variation, and consequential confusion, is perhaps to be expected. Many of the ethical 
harms that the principles in these documents purport to protect against are poorly understood because 
they are described too vaguely (Clarke, 2019). The vagueness of statements such as ‘AI systems may 
be discriminatory’ results in broad and generic rather than deep and specific responses. Additionally, 
as Carrillo  (2020, p. 3) explains: ‘beyond the basic underlying principles and common elements, ethical 
conceptions and principles vary across traditions, cultures, ideologies, systems and countries. In the 
end, if the expression ‘ethics’ in itself is universal, the content of ‘the ethical’ evolves and includes 
variable and flexible standards in accordance with the evolution of times and societies.’ The risks that 
arise from this lack of clear ethical guidance are many and include: ethics washing; ethics shopping; 
ethics dumping; ethics shirking and ethics lobbying (Floridi, 2019b). Hence, ethical principles have 
been accused of being too flexible (or too undefined) to be of practical use to AI practitioners 
(Mittelstadt, 2019; Whittlestone et al., 2019). The accusation is mistaken insofar as the ethical 
principles should be seen as providing the foundation and not the details of ethical practices, in a way 
comparable to what a Constitution does when compared to specific legislation. It would be mistaken 
to criticise the Constitution of a country for being of no direct practical use in the regulation of medical 
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appliances, for example. This is why a promising and reasonable approach to the problem of not-yet 
actionable AI ethical principles is to bring ethical guidance down to the Design level, by providing 
tools and methods that translate the ‘what’ of AI ethics into the ‘how’ of technical specifications. In 
doing so we can hope to create a bridge between abstract principles and technical implementations 
(Hagendorff, 2020). This is the solution that we explored in our previous research (Morley et al., 2019) 
and it is also the solution Digital Catapult are exploring in practice with the Digital Catapult AI Ethics 
Framework3 (Box 1). In both this theoretical and applied work, we have concluded that this lowering 
of abstraction is, at best, a partial solution. Whilst translational tools and methods do help to lower 
the level of abstraction, they leave a number of other issues unresolved, and can be manipulated by 
reprehensible actors (Aïvodji et al., 2019). 
In the following section we explore the limitations of translational tools in more detail. The 
Digital Catapult AI Ethics Framework (Box 1) can be considered an illustrative example of what we 
mean by ‘translational tool’. The discussion is deliberately generalised and we recognise that some of 
the limitations we discuss can be overcome by combining the use of translational tools with other 
offerings. For example, the Digital Catapult’s AI Ethics Framework is offered alongside more hands-
on ethics consultations.  This should be kept in mind so that we do not appear too critical and so that 
the motivation for us expanding on the concept of ‘Ethics as a Service’ in section 5 is clear.   
 
3. Limits of Principlism and Translational Tools 
The first limitation to highlight, is that translational tools and methods are extra-empirical. This means, 
as explained by Fazelpour and Lipton (2020), that they may set standards against which algorithmic 
practices are assessed, without themselves being subject to empirical evaluation. This leaves the 
translational tools vulnerable to manipulation. AI practitioners may choose the translational tool that 
aligns with what is for them the most convenient epistemological understanding of an ethical principle, 
rather than the one that aligns with society’s preferred understanding (Krishnan, 2019). For example, 
certain types of ‘explanation’ can be used to obfuscate rather than illuminate (Aïvodji et al., 2019) 
patterns of injustice. In short, stated motivations for using a specific translational tool might not reflect 
actual motivation (Schiff et al., 2020). 
 
3LF is chair of Digital Catapult’s Independent Ethics Board. LK, EA and FG were employees of Digital Catapult at the time of writing. JM’s work on 
applied AI ethics is partially funded by Digital Catapult. 
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Second, many of the existing translational tools and methods are ‘diagnostic’ but not 
‘prescriptive’. For example, they might identify whether a dataset is biased, but offer very little support 
to AI practitioners on how to overcome the issue. Others, as McMillan and Brown (2019) indicate, 
present ‘technical fixes’ to what are in essence socially-derived harms. Furthermore, when the 
parameters for the ‘diagnosis’ of fairness, transparency or accountability are set by the AI practitioners 
themselves, the potential for objective critique is easily lost and so the aim of the translational tool or 
method ceases to ‘ensure the algorithmic system meets the criteria of social preferability’ (Floridi & 
Taddeo, 2016) (and therefore ethical justifiability). Instead, the aim of the translational tool or method 
becomes to ‘ensure the algorithmic system meets the practitioner’s optimal criteria’ (Terzis, 2020). As 
Martin (2019, p. 842) attests ‘delegating a task to a technology [in this instance a ‘translational’ tool or 
method] does not remove the associated responsibility for that task. It is [still] a value-laden 
decision…’ In short, according to Fazelpour and Lipton, (2020, p. 58), when used in this way, 
translational tools and methods: (a) can lead to systematic neglect of some [unethical] injustices and 
distort our understanding of others; (b) do not by themselves offer sufficient practical guidance about 
what should be done, sometimes leading to misguided mitigation strategies; (c) do not, by themselves, 
make clear who, among decision-makers is responsible for intervening to right specific 
[unethical]injustices (our additions in brackets). 
Finally, too often these translational tools are positioned or perceived by AI practitioners as a 
‘one-off’ test: something that just needs to be completed for compliance purposes (to be awarded a 
‘kitemark’ of some description, for example) and then forgotten about. This encourages ethics by ‘tick-
box’ and introduces the risk of writing ethics into the business case and coding them out by the time 
the algorithmic system is deployed (Morley et al., 2019). Instead, the ethical implications of an 
algorithmic system should be regularly evaluated, at a minimum as part of three distinct phases: 
validation, verification and evaluation. The first phase (validation) is concerned with whether the right 
algorithmic system is being developed; the second phase (verification) is concerned with whether the 
algorithmic system is being developed in the right way; and the third phase (evaluation) is concerned 
with whether the algorithmic system is continuing to operate in the right way once deployed, needs to 
be revised, or can be improved (Floridi, 2019a). Thus, unless ethical evaluation becomes an integral 
part of a system’s operation (Arnold & Scheutz, 2018), there is no guarantee that pro-ethical 
translational tools will have any positive impact on the ethical implications of AI systems. Indeed, they 
could have a negative impact by fostering a false sense of security and consequential complacency.  
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This critique of AI ethics principlism and translational tools and methods raises the question 
whether the entire pro-ethical design endeavour is futile, if even with technical guidance, AI ethics is 
difficult or impossible to embed in the process of algorithmic design, development, deployment, and 
use. However, the experience of other applied ethics fields (for example, medical ethics and research 
ethics) shows that it is possible to operationalise abstract ethical principles successfully for the purpose 
of protecting individuals, groups, society and the environment from particular social harms and 
incentivising the best outcomes. The effort is not futile. With this reassurance in mind, the next 
pertinent question becomes: how can AI ethics be usefully operationalised for AI practitioners?  The 
next section offers a way forward. 
 
Box 1:  The Digital Catapult AI Ethics Framework (DCEF) 
The DCEF was developed by the Digital Catapult’s independent ethics board following consultation with a number of Digital Ethicists and other 
experts. The framework consists of four levels, and is intended to help AI start-ups working with the Digital Catapult to define and translate, 
transparently and contextually, high-level ethical principles into practice. The first level, therefore, consists of the five unifying high-level principles 
identified by Floridi et al., (2018): beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, justice, explicability. The second level consists of seven interpretations 
(or contextual definitions) of these principles identified through documentary analysis consultation with AI practitioners and those affected by AI 
systems. The third level operationalises Habermas’s concept of discourse ethics (Buhmann et al., 2019), i.e. an approach that seeks to establish 
normative values and ethical truths through open discourse, and consists of a series of questions that are designed to encourage AI practitioners to 
conduct ethical foresight analysis (Floridi & Strait, 2020).  The fourth level provides access to more practical, and less discursive tools e.g. python 
libraries designed to identify bias in data.  The connections between the levels are shown below.  Companies using the DCEF to translate high-level 
ethical principles into practice are encouraged to consult it at validation, verification and evaluation stages of their product development pipeline, to 
ensure that at each stage time is dedicated to thinking through the ethical implications of all decisions made. This discussion is supported by members 
of the independent4 ethics board through consultations which also provide a vehicle for reviewing the efficacy of the Framework itself.  
L1  Beneficence: promoting 
well-being, preserving 





security and ‘capability 
caution.’   
  
Autonomy: the power to 
decide (whether to 
decide).   
  
Justice: promoting 
prosperity and preserving 
solidarity.   
  
Explicability: enabling 
the other principles 
through intelligibility and 
accountability.   
  
L2  Be clear about the benefits 
of the product or service.   
  
Consider the business 
model.   
  
Know and manage the 
risks.   
  
Use data responsibly   
  
  
Be open and 
understandable in 
communications.   
  
Promote diversity, equality 
and inclusion.  
  
Be worthy of trust.  
  
L3  For example:  
  
What are the goals, 
purposes and intended 
applications of the product 
or service?  
  
Who or what might benefit 
from the 
product/service? Consider 
For example  
  
Is the training data 
appropriate for the 
intended use?  
  
Have potential biases in 
the data been examined, 
well-understood and 
documented and is there a 
For example:  
  
Does the company 
communicate clearly, 
honestly and directly about 
any potential risks of the 
product or service being 
provided?  
  
For example:  
  
Are there processes in 
place to establish whether 
the product or service 
might have a negative 
impact on the rights and 
liberties of individuals or 
groups?   
  
For example:  
  
Is there a process to review 
and assure the integrity of 
the AI system over time 
and take remedial action if 




4 By ‘Independent’ we mean board where none of the members are employees of the AI company in question but are 
still embedded within the company to a sufficient degree as to be able to have access to necessary documentation, data 
and code, and understanding of the socio-technical context (‘International AI Ethics Panel Must Be Independent’, 2019; 
Raji et al., 2020). If necessary, this can be managed by placing the board members under non-disclosure agreements. 
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all potential groups of 
beneficiaries, whether 
individual users, groups or 
society and environment as 
a whole.  
  




Are the company’s policies 
relating to ethical 
principles available publicly 
and to employees? Are the 
processes to implement 
and update the policies 
open and transparent?  
  
Does the company have a 
diversity and inclusiveness 
policy in relation to 
recruitment and retention 
of staff?  
  
Does the company have a 
clear and easy to use 
system for third party/user 
or stakeholder concerns to 
be raised and handled?  
  
L4  
See: https://www.digicatapult.org.uk/for-startups/other-programmes/applied-ai-ethics-typology  
 




4. A series of compromises  
Thus far we have seen that the need to Design AI solutions pro-ethically is well recognised, and that 
the field of AI-ethics now has a solid foundation comprised of principle-based governing documents 
and translational tools and methods. Developing this foundation has been essential and the individual 
components remain highly valuable. However, pro-ethical Design practices remain difficult to 
operationalise practically as the Goldilocks Level of Abstraction has not yet been found. Attempts 
thus far remain either too flexible or too strict. To overcome these limitations, the ‘just right’ Level of 
Abstraction needs to be identified by making a series of compromises. 
  
4.1 Finding a compromise between too flexible and too strict   
Raab (2020) argues that top-down, prescriptive guidelines imply that it is possible to take a formulaic 
approach to the application of ethical norms, principles and general rules to specific instances. In 
reality, the argument continues, applied ethics requires judgement. Specifically, it requires an ability to 
consider how risks, conflicting rights and interests, and social preferability varies depending on a 
particular context. The ethical implications of deploying an AI system in a healthcare setting are 
unlikely to be the same as the ethical implications of deploying an AI system in an educational setting. 
Similarly, the boundaries of social preferability within Europe may not be the same as the boundaries 
within Asia and these boundaries may change with time or with type of algorithm, or even with stage 
of development. Finally, ethical guidelines that are too strict portray algorithmic systems as static 
products of code and data that once deployed continue to operate in the same way as intended and 
have only the intended (positive) effects. Ananny & Crawford, (2018) point out the reality is that 
algorithmic systems are assemblages of human and non-human actors which have many non-
deterministic impacts. To understand (and therefore govern) the ethical implications requires 
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understanding how the whole system works – including what may happen once the system is deployed 
and used by entities, or for purposes, other than the original practitioners or stated purpose. 
With this in mind, if AI ethics is to be operationalised in a way that is useful to AI practitioners 
and simultaneously protective of individuals, groups, society and the environment, then the 
operationalisation must: (a) happen at the appropriate Level of Abstraction (where translational tools 
are neither too flexible, nor too strict); and (b) must not consist solely of a one-off tick-box exercise 
completed only at the beginning of the Design process.  Developing a practical pro-ethical Design 
approach that meets these two criteria is not simple, but it is not impossible. It requires a shift in the 
way that AI ethics is framed. The practice of AI ethics should not be seen as an end-goal that can be 
objectively achieved, observed, quantified, or compared. Instead it should be seen as a reflective 
development process, which also aims to help AI practitioners understand their own subjectivity and 
biases within a given set of circumstances (Terzis, 2020). By enabling the development of this 
understanding, a reflective process can help illuminate why unethical outcomes may occur so that the 
appropriate mitigation or avoidance strategy can be put in place (Fazelpour & Lipton, 2020). From 
this perspective, the practical operationalisation of AI ethics becomes less about the paternalistic 
imposition of inflexible standards that ignore context and more about procedural regularity and public 
reason that can be adapted and shared across contexts and societies (Binns, 2018; Kroll et al., 2017). 
In practice, structured identification and transparent communication of tradeoffs help organisations 
arrive at resolutions that, even when imperfect, are at least publicly defensible (Whittlestone et al., 
2019). 
An operationalisation of AI ethics focused on procedural regularity and public reason would 
commit a company producing algorithmic systems to: 
a)  justifying all design decisions to a set of common principles agreed through an inclusive 
and discursive process that involves all individuals, groups and environmental 
representatives likely to be directly or indirectly affected by the AI products of a specific 
company or research group. These principles should be reviewed periodically (e.g., 
annually); 
b) following a set and repeatable procedure to define and translate each of the agreed upon 
principles into technical standards in a way that achieves an acceptable level of ethical 
justifiability and environmental sustainability within the specific context; and 
c)  ensuring appropriate oversight is in place at the validation, verification and evaluation 
stages. 
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Companies operationalising AI ethics in this way would use translational tools and ethical principles 
in the same way each time (and at repeated intervals to cover validation, verification, evaluation) but 
accept that the exact way in which they are applied is contextually dependent.  This kind of shift away 
from abstract rules towards negotiated ethics has already been seen in arguments for a move from 
privacy by design to privacy engineering. Privacy engineering, as described by Alshammari & Simpson 
(2017, p. 162), is a ‘means of applying engineering principles and process in developing and 
maintaining systems in a systematic and repeatable way, with a view to achieving acceptable levels of 
privacy protection’ without assuming that the way that this is achieved will be the same in each instance 
or immutable through time or different contexts. Additionally, this approach to operationalisation 
covers the five pillars of good ethical governance set out by Winfield & Jirotka (2018) by turning AI 
ethics into a ‘collaborative process, developed and iteratively (re)configured through material practices 
and continued negotiations’ (Orr & Davis, 2020, p. 731). However, if the responsibility for the whole 
process still sits with just the AI practitioners themselves, there remains a risk that the 
operationalisation process itself becomes subject to manipulation and may be used solely for ethics 
washing purposes. 
  
4.2 Finding a compromise between devolved and centralised responsibility 
One often highlighted option for avoiding these potential issues – derived from a lack of accountability 
and transparency – is to rely on external algorithmic audits (Holstein et al., 2018; Mökander et al., 
forthcoming). In theory, the process described above could be managed internally by the company in 
question but audited by a third party (Mökander et al., forthcoming). Several auditing mechanisms 
have been proposed as means of examining the inputs and outputs of algorithms for bias and other 
harms (Cath, 2018; Sandvig, 2014). For example, ‘Aequitas’ is an open source toolkit which audits 
algorithms for bias and fairness (Saleiro et al., 2018) and ‘Turingbox’ is a proposed platform that would 
audit the explainability of an algorithmic system (Epstein et al., 2018). As these technical methods, 
and more human-based methods such as ‘sock-puppet’ auditing (Sandvig, 2014), have gained visibility, 
the perceived importance of the role they will play in ethical governance has also increased. In the 
UK, for example, the Information Commissioner’s Office is developing an AI auditing framework 
that seeks to ensure organisations have measures in place to be compliant with data protection 
requirements, and mitigate risks associated with (amongst other issues) fairness, accuracy, security, 
and fundamental rights (Binns, 2018). Similarly, auditing firm PwC includes ethical audit as a key 
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component of its responsible AI Framework (Oxborough et al., 2019). It is clear, therefore, that 
external ethical auditing will be a key component of any form of operationalised AI ethics. 
However, there remain limitations. Proposed external auditing mechanisms typically focus on 
specific parts of the system, rather than looking at the overall system function (Cath, 2018), and so do 
little to address the risks of ‘unpredictability’ described above. Audits cannot guarantee to reveal all 
aspects of a system (Kroll, 2018), and so may miss the inputs that are the most harmful. In addition, 
they are typically conducted after a system has already been deployed, and so may have already had a 
negative impact (Raji et al., 2020). And, finally, audits may be rendered not viable without legislative 
change due to legal concerns regarding protection of consumer data or trade secrets (Katyal, 2019; 
Kroll et al., 2017). Moreover, it is difficult to quantify indirect externalities that accumulate over time 
(Rahwan, 2018). External auditors may therefore not only lack access but also resources, know-how 
and computational power to review AI systems (Kroll, 2018).  Raji and colleagues (2020) discuss these 
limitations in detail and also note that the agile nature of AI development and typical lack of 
documentation challenges auditability. Furthermore, they stress how the lack of foresight analysis 
typically included in external post-hoc audits minimises the chances for audits to prevent future harms. 
They argue that internal audits, conducted by a dedicated team of organisational employees – but not 
the AI practitioners themselves – with full access to data and a focus on ethical foresight could be a 
pragmatic alternative. There is certainly some promise in this proposal. Code review and internal 
checks for reliability and robustness are already common practices within software engineering. 
Furthermore, internal auditing of this nature would mitigate the risks associated with external auditing 
(or fully-external ethical review boards) of ethically desensitising, de-skilling, and de-responsabilising 
company employees, and instead force companies to make their own critical choices and assume 
explicit responsibilities (Floridi, 2016). Yet, it is also undeniable that internal auditors may face 
conflicts of interest that make it hard for them to maintain an independent and objective opinion (Raji 
et al., 2020). This is especially true when there are currently limited incentives for companies to 
rigorously examine the implications behind technologies that are both profitable and powerful (Katyal, 
2019). Thus, just as it was necessary to find a compromise between mechanisms that are too fleixible 
or too strict, it seems that there is also a need to find a compromise between completely devolved and 
completely centralised responsibility for holding the ethical governance process itself accountable. 
The solution here lies in the creation of a multi-agent system where the responsibility is 
distributed across different agents (individuals, companies) in a way that (a) aggregates the possibly 
good actions, so that the latter might reach the critical mass necessary to make a positive difference to 
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the targeted environment and its inhabitants, and (b) isolates possibly negative actions (e.g., attempts 
to ethics wash), so that they never reach the necessary threshold to breach the fault-tolerance level of 
the overall system and undermine its effectiveness as an ethical governance mechanism (Floridi, 2013, 
2016). This may seem overly theoretical, but it is actually a practically feasible approach, and a 
pragmatic analogy can be found in cloud computing, as explained in the next section. 
  
5. Outlining Ethics as a Service 
Cloud computing, the on-demand delivery of various computing services over the internet, has three 
models of service: Software as a Service (SaaS), Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), and Platform as a 
Service (PaaS). 
Software as a Service is the model of cloud computing that consumers are most readily familiar 
with. All aspects of the service are managed by a third-party, there are few customisation opportunities, 
and often there is a high risk of vendor lock-in. In our analogy regarding AI ethical governance, this 
would represent the fully devolved model of governance (and one that is too strict). A third party 
would be responsible for dictating the set of ethical principles, for outlining the process that must be 
followed at each of the validation, verification, evaluation stages, and for conducting an ethical audit 
to see whether the process was followed correctly and whether this resulted in the expected positive 
outcomes. 
Infrastructure as a Service, in comparison, represents the fully centralised governance model 
(and one that is too flexible). In cloud computing, servers, network operating systems, and storage are 
all provided via a dashboard or application programme interface (API), so that users have complete 
control over the entire infrastructure. In terms of ethical governance, this would involve the AI 
practitioners being responsible for both developing the AI ethics principles as well as the process to 
follow internally with limited meaningful engagement with external stakeholders. The AO 
practitioners would also be responsible for conducting internal audits.  
Finally, there is Platform as a Service which represents the compromises we have outlined 
above. It is the Goldilocks option found between methods that are too flexible and strict, and between 
devolved governance and centralised governance. In the world of cloud computing, PaaS represents 
a set-up where the cloud provider provides the core infrastructure, such as operating systems and 
storage, but users have access to a platform that enables them to develop custom software or 
applications. These three options are summarised in Figure 1. 
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  Centralised Responsibility (too 
flexible) 
(Infrastructure as a Service) 
Distributed Responsibility 
(Ethics as a Service) 
(Platform as a Service) 
Devolved Responsibility (too 
strict) 
(Software as a Service) 
Internal Responsibility Developing ethical Code and 
contextually defining meaning of 
each principle 
Evaluating selecting and using 
translational tools and methods 
  
Conducting ethical review of own 
product at 3 stages and including 
ethical foresight analysis 
Auditing AI systems for ethical 
compliance and social impact 
Contextually defining meaning 
of each principle within the 
ethical Code 
Selecting and using translational 
tools/methods from a pre-
approved list of available 
translational tools/methods 
Conducting ethical review of 
own product at 3 stages and 





Using the translational 






External Responsibility N/A Developing ethical Code,  
regularly reviewing it and 
developing a set process that AI 
practitioners must follow to 
contextually define principles 
Evaluating available translational 
tools/methods and compiling a 
pre-approved list available for 
selection and use by the internal 
AI practitioners and developing a 
process that AI practitioners 
must follow to contextually to 
select which of the pre-approved 
translational tools/methods they 
will use  
Auditing AI systems for ethical 
compliance and social impact 
Developing ethical Code and 
contextually defining the meaning 
of each principle included in the 
code.                 
  
Evaluating and dictating exactly 
which translational tools and 
methods can be used by the 
internal AI practitioners 
  
  
Conducting ethical review of 
product at 3 stages and including 
ethical foresight analysis as part 
of overall auditing of AI systems 
for ethical compliance and social 
impact 
  
Figure 1: Comparison of distributions of responsibility for ethics-related activities in different AI ethics governance 
models. Centralised responsibility and devolved responsibility models represent the status quo, the Ethics as a Service 
model is the new proposal.  
  
  
In the world of AI ethical governance, Ethics as a Service – based on Platform as a Service model – 
could involve several components including, but not necessarily limited to: an independent multi-
disciplinary ethics board; a collaboratively developed ethical code; and AI practitioners themselves. 
Responsibility could then be distributed across these components thus: 
  
1.  Independent multi-disciplinary ethics advisory board responsible for providing the core 
infraethics as described: 
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a.  The development of a principle-based ethical code through a process of discussion 
and negotiation that treats ethical patients (i.e. individuals, businesses and 
environments that may be impacted by the systems produced by the AI company in 
question) as real interlocutors, who can genuinely impact the design of the 
system(Aitken et al., 2019; Arvan, 2018; Durante, 2015). 
b.  The setting out of a process that needs to be followed at validation, verification and 
evaluation stages of algorithmic Design to ensure pro-ethical design by: (i) defining 
contextually the specific meaning of each of the principles in the ethical code; and (ii) 
providing an appropriate range of proven-effective translational tools which can be 
selected to translate from principles to practice, according to the contextually specific 
definitions. This process and selection of translational tools must include an element 
of ethical foresight analysis (Floridi & Strait, 2020), and mechanisms for closing down, 
and rectifying the consequences of a system that is found to be in breach of the 
principles (Morley et al., 2020). It must also recognise that positive, ethical features are 
open to progressive increase, that is an algorithm can be increasingly fair, and fairer 
than another algorithm or a previous version, but makes no sense to say that it is fair 
or unfair in absolute terms (compare this to the case of speed: it makes sense to say 
that an object is moving quickly, or that it is fast or faster than another, but not that it 
is fast in absolute terms).  
c.  Conducting regular audits of the whole behaviour of the company – not just the end 
product once launched – to see whether it is genuinely committed to ethical conduct; 
whether AI practitioners are following the defined process; and whether the final 
output is ethically justifiable according to contextually-defined principles. 
2.  The internal company employees (the AI practitioners themselves) responsible for 
providing the ‘customised software,’ namely: 
a.  Contextually defining the principles; 
b.   Identifying the appropriate tools, and putting them to use whilst designing a specific 
algorithmic system; 
c.  Documenting how the process was followed, in public, and justifying why specific 
decisions were made, when and by who. 
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In theory, distributing the responsibility for operationalising AI ethics in this manner will overcome 
many (although definitely not all) of the limitations of current approaches described above. However, 
whether it works in practice is yet to be seen. It is also important to note that, because AI systems 
learn and update their internal decision-making logic over time, code-audits (as described in 1c above) 
need to be complemented with continuous functionality and impact audits. However, such audits 
inevitably impose both financial and administrative costs (Brundage et al., 2020). Care should therefore 
be taken to not put undue burden on certain sectors in society (Koene et al., 2019). One way to balance 
the need for audits with incentives for innovation is to introduce a progressive level of AI governance 
that is proportional to the risk level associated with a specific combination of technology and context. 
Therefore, testing of the concept must involve experimentation to find the proportionate degree of 
oversight for different AI solutions. For this reason (and others), further research is urgently needed 
on how to evaluate translational tools and, in doing so, evaluate the current impact of the AI ethics 
endeavour in order to highlight further ways in which it could be improved. To start this research, a 
partial pilot of “Ethics as a Service,” which includes the Digital Catapult AI Ethics framework (Box 
1), ethics consultations and an Independent multi-disciplinary ethics advisory board is being trialed by 
Digital Catapult. We would encourage others to develop partial or complete pilots of the concept and 
to publicly report on the successes and failures so that a commons of knowledge related to ‘best ethical 
practice’ can be established.  
 
 6. Conclusion 
As Thomsen (2019) states, ‘ethics for AI cannot be expected to be any simpler than ethics for humans.’ 
Indeed, it may be more complicated, since it adds to it further technical issues. Research ethics and 
medical ethics have always involved a combination of the law, ethical governance policies, practices, 
and procedures, with contextual discursive and procedural support. This combination approach has 
enabled these branches of applied ethics to find a good balance between being too strict and too 
flexible , and between too centralised and too devolved. Therefore, it seems reasonable to hypothesise 
that AI ethics would benefit from an equally customisable approach, and that if this balance can be 
achieved then the pro-ethical Design endeavour may succeed. At the very least shifting the focus of 
AI ethics away from principles to procedural regularity will make AI ethics seem more relatable to AI 
practitioners. Encouraging a procedural approach can, for example, help make the parallels between 
AI ethics and other quality assurance processes, such as safety testing, clearer and thus make it more 
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obvious why careful consideration needs to be given to each Design decision.  We hope that the idea 
of Ethics as a Service, as outlined in the article, has at least highlighted this.  
  Whilst these opportunities for moving forward the conversation about AI ethics and the role 
that Ethics as a Service may play in this, should be celebrated,  it must be acknowledged that the 
impacts of AI systems cannot be entirely controlled through technical design (Orr & Davis, 2020).   
Biased AI is not simply the result of biased datasets, for example. AI solutions themselves are complex 
and are then deployed into complex systems. In complex systems, agents interact with each other and 
with other systems in unexpected ways, making their response to change unpredictable and non-linear. 
It is, therefore, likely that we will genuinely not know whether any approaches to ‘pro-ethical’ Design 
have made an impact (positive or negative) on the social impact of an algorithmic system until after it 
has been deployed. Regular re-evaluation of all aspects of algorithm systems, and the extent to which 
they achieve their goals, including pro-ethical Design approaches, will be crucial. Hence, further 
qualitative research and empirical testing will be needed to understand in detail the benefits, and 
drawbacks, as well as the practicalities of Ethics as a Service. This will be our next task. 
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